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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 William Scott Demint appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon his conditional guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine and unlawful 
possession of a firearm.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
 
In August 2014, narcotics officers requested that Ada County Sheriff’s 
Deputy Kevin Lowry look for a specific pickup truck that was traveling on I-84 
near Boise.  (2/25/15 Tr., p.86, L.22 – p.88, L.1.)  Deputy Lowry located the 
vehicle and began following it.  (2/25/15 Tr., p.88, Ls.4-18.)  Deputy Lowry soon 
effectuated a traffic stop on the vehicle after observing it traveling at speeds in 
excess of posted limits, and changing lanes without signaling.  (2/25/15 Tr., p.88, 
L.16 – p.89, L.2.)  The driver of the vehicle was identified as William Demint.  
(2/25/15 Tr., p.94, Ls.16-23.) 
While another officer checked Demint’s license and warrant information 
through dispatch, Deputy Lowry deployed his drug dog around the vehicle.  
(2/25/15 Tr., p.96, L.23 – p.98, L.5.)   The dog alerted near the open driver’s side 
window.  (2/25/15 Tr., p.98, L.25 – p.99, L.8.)  Deputy Lowry opened the driver’s 
side door to allow the dog to search the extended passenger cab area of the 
truck.  (2/25/15 Tr., p.100, Ls.1-18.)  The dog did not alert in this area.  (2/25/15 
Tr., p.100, Ls.10-21.)  Deputy Lowry then deployed the dog in the enclosed truck 
bed.  (2/25/15 Tr., p.100, L.19 – p.101, L.1; see also State’s Exhibits A, B, C.)  




Deputy Lowry searched the first-aid kit and recovered 441 grams of 
methamphetamine separated into multiple bags, 12.79 grams of marijuana, 
hydromorphone pills, and $12,794 in cash.  (2/25/15 Tr., p.44, L.21 – p. 45, L.11; 
p.101, Ls.2-16; PSI, pp.3-4, 95, 110-114.)  Officers also recovered a loaded 9mm 
handgun and numerous glass pipes and bongs from elsewhere in the vehicle.  
(PSI, p.4, 114.) 
The state charged Demint with trafficking in methamphetamine, 
possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to deliver, unlawful possession of a 
firearm, possession of hydromorphone, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, 
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and the persistent violator 
sentencing enhancement.  (R., pp.53-55, 126-128.)   
Prior to trial, Demint moved to suppress evidence recovered from the 
vehicle.  (R., pp.80-82.)  Prior to the suppression hearing, the district court 
permitted Demint to join in the issues raised by the motion to suppress and 
supporting brief filed by his co-defendant, who was a passenger in the pickup 
truck.  (See generally 2/24/15 Tr.1)  In his motion to suppress, Demint’s co-
defendant argued that the drug dog’s alert on the passenger compartment of the 
truck did not provide probable cause to search the enclosed truck bed.  (2/17/15 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, pp.3-6.2)  After a hearing, the 
district court denied the joint motion to suppress.  (2/25/15 Tr., p.169, L.5 – 
                                            
1 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Demint’s motion to augment the appellate 
record with this transcript.  (1/19/16 Order.) 
 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Demint’s motion to augment the appellate 
record with Demint’s co-defendant’s motion to suppress and memorandum in 




p.174, L.17.)  The court concluded that the drug dog’s alert near the driver’s side 
window of the vehicle gave the officers probable cause to search the entire 
vehicle, including the enclosed truck bed.  (Id.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Demint entered a conditional 
guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a 
firearm.  (R., pp.148-157; 3/31/15 Tr, p.175, L.4 – p.191, L.3.)  The state agreed 
to dismiss the remaining charges and to withdraw the sentencing enhancement.  
(R., p.150; 3/31/15 Tr., p.175, Ls.12-15.)  As a condition of the plea agreement, 
Demint preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress.  (R., pp.150, 156-157; 3/31/15 Tr., p.175, Ls.17-21.)   
The district court imposed a unified 20-year sentence with 10 years fixed 
for trafficking in methamphetamine, and a consecutive five-year sentence with 
two and one-half years fixed for unlawful possession of a firearm.  (R., pp.166-







Demint states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Demint’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.): 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Did Demint fail to preserve the ground for suppression he raises on 







































Demint Failed To Preserve The Ground For Suppression He Raises On Appeal 
 
A. Introduction 
Demint appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to 
suppress evidence obtained from his vehicle after a traffic stop.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.5-14.)  Specifically, he contends that whatever probable cause officers 
acquired to search the vehicle following the drug dog’s alert on the driver’s side 
window of the vehicle dissipated after the drug dog failed to alert inside the 
extended passenger cab.  (Id.)   
This ground for suppression was waived because Demint failed to 
preserve it for appeal by raising it below.  In any event, a review of the record 
and applicable law reveals that the officers had sufficient probable cause to 
justify a search of the entire truck, including the enclosed truck bed.  Therefore, 
Demint cannot show that the district court erred in denying his suppression 
motion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, 
the appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review.  State v. Purdum, 147 
Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 
232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005)). The appellate court will accept the trial court’s 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the trial 
court’s application of constitutional principles and determinations of reasonable 




(citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007)), State v. 
Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 127, 233 P.3d 52, 58 (2010). 
 
C. Demint Failed To Preserve The Ground For Suppression He Raises On 
Appeal 
 
It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection 
must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.  State v. 
Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000)).  Further, 
when a defendant pursues a suppression motion, only the specific grounds 
raised in the district court are preserved for appeal.  See e.g., State v. Anderson, 
154 Idaho 703, 705-706, 302 P.3d 328, 330-331 (2012) (holding that the 
defendant preserved only two of the three grounds for suppression that he 
attempted to raise on appeal).  
In this case, Demint argues that whatever probable cause officers 
acquired to search his pickup truck following the drug dog’s alert on the driver’s 
side window of the vehicle dissipated after the drug dog failed to alert inside the 
extended passenger cab.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-14.)  Demint did not raise this 
argument below.  Instead, Demint argued to the district court that the drug dog’s 
alert on the driver’s side window of the vehicle, and other circumstances known 
to the officer, did not provide sufficient probable cause to search the enclosed 
truck bed.  (See 2/17/15 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress; 2/25/15 
Tr., p.152, L.6 – p.169, L.4.)  The district court therefore did not have the 




raises on appeal.  This argument is therefore waived, and should not be 
considered by this Court. 
 
D. In The Alternative, The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Demint’s 
Motion to Suppress 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  “A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls 
within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.”  State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 
2000) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see also 
State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).)  The 
automobile exception is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement.  
Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3 (1980); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 800, 
964 P.2d 660, 667 (1998). 
The “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement allows the police to 
search a vehicle without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe the 
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.  Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979); State v. Buti, 
131 Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 
P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981).  The existence of probable cause to believe a vehicle 
contains evidence of criminal activity “authorizes a search of any area of the 
vehicle in which the evidence might be found.”  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 




In Ross, the Supreme Court of the United States reasoned that a “lawful 
search of fixed premises” such as a home “generally extends to the entire area in 
which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility 
that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.”  
Ross, 456 U.S. at 820-21.  Because such distinctions were not drawn in relation 
to home searches, there is no reason to draw them in relation to vehicle 
searches.  Id. at 821.  Thus, “[w]hen a legitimate search is under way, and when 
its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between 
closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or between glove 
compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of 
a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of 
the task at hand.”  Id.  The Court concluded, “[i]f probable cause justifies the 
search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the 
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”  Id. at 825  
Furthermore, “[a] reliable drug dog’s alert on the exterior of a vehicle is 
sufficient, in and of itself, to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of 
the interior.”  Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706, 302 P.3d at 331.  Probable cause 
established by the dog alert “‘authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in 
which the evidence might be found.’”  Id. (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 347).  Put 
another way, the dog alert establishing probable cause “justifies the search of 
every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the 




In Anderson, as a matter of first impression, the Idaho Supreme Court 
addressed the question of whether probable cause, once established, can 
dissipate.  Id. at 705-708, 302 P.3d at 330-333.  In that case, a drug dog alerted 
on the passenger side door of Anderson’s van following a traffic stop.  Id. at 705, 
302 P.3d at 330.  The dog subsequently failed to alert inside the van.  Id.  
Officers later manually searched the van and recovered an illegally-possessed 
rife.  Id.  On appeal, Demint argued, among other things, that any probable cause 
obtained by the officers when the drug dog alerted outside the passenger side of 
the van dissipated after the dog failed to alert inside the van.  Id. at 705-706, 302 
P.3d at 330-331.   
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized that “[i]f probable cause is 
established at an early stage of the investigation, it may be dissipated if the 
investigating officer later learns additional information that decreases the 
likelihood that the defendant has engaged, or is engaging, in criminal activity.”  
Id. at 706-707, 302 P.3d at 331-332 (quoting United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 
427 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2005).  The Court then summarized cases from other 
jurisdictions which “generally held that a drug dog’s failure to alert is only one 
factor to be considered in the probable cause analysis.”  Id. at 707, 302 P.3d at 
332 (citations omitted).  The Court applied these concepts to the case before it 
and concluded:  
Here, we find that the officers conducting the search of 
Anderson’s vehicle maintained probable cause even after the drug 
dog failed to alert in its interior.  We agree with the courts noted 
above that a failed alert is not per se dispositive of probable cause, 
but rather merely one factor to be considered in the totality of the 




Siluk, 567 So.2d 26 (Fla. App. 1990)] found, a subsequent failed 
alert does not necessarily negate a prior positive alert.  In other 
words, the positive-alert-negative-alert issue is not a zero-sum 
equation.  Thus, although in this case the drug dog’s subsequent 
failure to alert may call its initial alert into some question in the mind 
of a reasonable person, it does not neutralize the first alert 
completely.  Nor did the subsequent failure to alert indicate a 
positive indication on the part of the dog that no drugs existed.  
Moreover, as other courts facing the issue have found, couriers of 
drugs often mask the scent of contraband such that they may go 
undetected by trained canines.  Thus, it is entirely possible that a 
drug dog may reliably detect drugs in a sniff on one occasion but 
fail to detect them on another, particularly where the two sniffs are 
conducted in separate parts of the area to be searched. 
 
Id. at 708, 302 P.3d at 333. 
 The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that “even if the initial alert was 
somewhat undercut by the subsequent failed sniff,” there was still sufficient 
probable cause to manually search the vehicle, particularly in light of additional 
circumstances, including Anderson’s erratic driving pattern and failure to follow 
the officers’ commands during the stop.  Id. 
In the present case, as the district court correctly concluded, once the 
drug dog alerted near the open driver’s side window of the pickup truck, the 
officers had probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including the enclosed 
cab.  (2/25/25 Tr., p.169, L.5 – p.174, L.17.)  After obtaining this probable cause 
to search the entire vehicle, the officer could have lawfully engaged in a manual 
search of any part of the vehicle.  Instead, the officer chose to utilize the drug 
dog to first target his search on the extended passenger cab area of the truck.  
(2/25/15 Tr., p.100, L.1-18.)  After the dog failed to alert in the extended 
passenger cab (2/25/15 Tr., p.100, Ls.10-21), the officer deployed the drug dog 




L.19 – p.101, L.1).  There, the drug dog alerted (2/25/15 Tr., p.101, Ls.2-16), and 
the officers ultimately recovered controlled substances and paraphernalia in that 
area.  (2/25/15 Tr., p.44, L.21 – p. 45, L.11; p.101, Ls.2-16; PSI, pp.3-4, 95, 110-
114.)   
The drug dog’s failure to alert in the first place the officer happened to look 
-- the extended passenger cab -- did not dissipate the probable cause possessed 
by the officer after the dog initially alerted on the outside of the vehicle.  The drug 
dog’s failure to alert in the extended passenger cab did not decrease the 
likelihood that controlled substances would be recovered in other parts of the 
vehicle.  Instead, the dog’s failure to alert was simply the functional equivalent of 
an officer failing to recover contraband in the first part of a vehicle (or other 
location or object), the officer searches after obtaining probable cause.  The 
Fourth Amendment does not require an officer who has probable cause to search 
an entire vehicle to correctly predict, on the officer’s first attempt, where in the 
vehicle contraband may be located.     
Therefore, application of the probable cause dissipation analysis utilized 
by the Idaho Supreme Court in Anderson reveals that there was no such 
dissipation in the present case.  Unlike the drug dog deployed by the officer in 
and around Demint’s vehicle, the drug dog utilized in Anderson did not alert 




302 P.3d at 330-331.3  The drug dog’s failure to alert anywhere inside 
Anderson’s van, after the dog previously alerted outside of the van, decreased, 
somewhat, the likelihood that the officers would subsequently recover 
contraband in the same areas inside the van where the dog failed to alert.  To the 
contrary, in the present case, the drug dog’s failure to alert in the extended 
passenger cab of Demint’s truck did not decrease the likelihood that officers 
would subsequently recover contraband in the enclosed truck bed area.   
Therefore, no probable cause dissipation occurred with respect to the enclosed 
truck bed.  
Likewise, the authorities cited in Anderson, which have recognized the 
concept of probable cause dissipation, addressed fact patterns involving either: 
(1) a drug dog’s failure to alert on a single object, such as a suitcase, which is 
subsequently searched by police, see e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 342 F.3d 
1210, 1211-1213 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923, 925-929, 
(9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 743-744,  (3rd Cir. 1993); or 
(2) a drug dog’s failure to alert on an entire vehicle which is subsequently 
searched by police, see e.g., McKay v. State, 814 A.2d 592, 598-599 (Md. App. 
2002); State v. Sanchez–Loredo, 220 P.3d 374, 378 (Kan. App. 2009).  In both 
types of instances, officers’ probable cause dissipated, (to some limited degree), 
due to the dogs’ failure to alert on the very same object or portion of a vehicle 
                                            
3 The Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in Anderson stated that the drug dog “failed 
to alert a second time while inside the van” after previously alerting on the 
passenger side door.  Anderson, 154 Idaho at 705, 302 P.3d at 330.  The Idaho 
Court of Appeals’ related preceding opinion, State v. Anderson, 2011 WL 
1744274 *1 (Idaho App. 2011), more specifically provided that “the dog did not 




where contraband was ultimately found.  This is different from the present case, 
where the drug dog did alert both outside Demint’s truck, and inside a specific 
portion of the truck.    
For similar reasons, even if this Court finds that the drug dog’s failure to 
alert inside the extended passenger cab of Demint’s truck resulted in some 
dissipation of probable cause to search the enclosed bed area, the dissipation 
was not enough to render the probable cause invalid in the circumstances of this 
case.  As discussed above, the drug dog’s failure to alert in one area of Demint’s 
truck did not make it less likely that contraband would be found in a different area 
of the same truck.  That is particularly apparent in the circumstances of this case 
where the drug dog initially alerted at an open window of the truck.  This alert 
indicated that the targeted odor was passing through the vehicle as a whole, and 
that controlled substances were likely present somewhere in the truck – though 
not necessarily in the extended passenger cab.    
Demint has failed to demonstrate that the probable cause possessed by 
officers dissipated after the drug dog failed to alert in the extended passenger 
cab area of the truck.  Therefore, even if this issue had been preserved for 
appeal, Demint failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his 










 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s 
denial of Demint’s motion to suppress.  
 DATED this 13th day of June, 2016. 
 
       
 __/s/ Mark W. Olson___ 
 MARK W. OLSON 
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